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When deployed U.S. soldiers attempt to influence the attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors of
civilians, success can save lives and failure can be deadly. Survey data from 228 military
personnel with deployment experience to Iraq and Afghanistan revealed that in a challeng-
ing wartime environment, empathy, respect, prior relationships, and familiarity with influ-
ence targets predicted success in cross-cultural influence attempts. Influence techniques
involving resources and positive feelings were used more commonly in relatively success-
ful influence attempts; negative tactics were used more commonly in unsuccessful attempts.
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techniques
For U.S. soldiers deployed in Iraq or Afghani-
stan, successful attempts to influence civilians to
alter anti-American beliefs, change attitudes to-
ward occupying U.S. forces, and share informa-
tion about planned attacks or improvised explo-
sive device (IED) placement can save lives. When
such influence attempts—defined as any acts
aimed at changing the attitudes, beliefs, and/or
behaviors of an individual or group—fail, the re-
sults can be deadly. In addition to the very high
stakes involved, the influence attempts of U.S.
soldiers abroad differ in many ways from the
types of influence attempts studied most often in
the research literature (e.g., Branzei, 2002; Hig-
gins, Judge, & Ferris, 2003; Leong, Bond, & Fu,
2006). Typical field studies look at employees
attempting to influence supervisors to get a pay
raise; typical laboratory studies look at attempts to
make a favorable impression in a job interview
(Higgins et al., 2003). Deployed soldiers must
negotiate differences in language, culture, beliefs,
and agendas while wearing uniforms and carrying
weapons. Cross-cultural studies of influence at-
tempts typically study whether the effectiveness
of particular approaches within organizations are
comparable in the United States and other coun-
tries (see, e.g., Botero, Foste, & Pace, 2012; Le-
ong et al., 2006). Deployed soldiers, in contrast,
attempt to influence people from a different cul-
tural background without being part of a shared
institution that defines the relationship between
them.
The current study contributes to existing influ-
ence literature by looking at cross-cultural influ-
ence attempts of deployed U.S. soldiers and
offering practical recommendations to military
members operating in these environments. Based
on online surveys completed by soldiers who had
interacted with local populations while deployed
to Iraq and Afghanistan, the study assesses what
features of influence attempts aimed at local indi-
viduals or groups (the influence targets) predict
perceived failure or success across a variety of
objectives and situations.
Influence Techniques
Influence techniques (also called tactics) are
specific methods employed during an attempt to
change the attitudes, beliefs, and/or behaviors
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of a target audience. For example, using data
and information to make a logical argument is a
rational tactic; offering to return a favor in the
future is an exchange tactic. Scholars have pro-
posed a wide range of classifications ranging
from the simple distinction between more pos-
itive and negative approaches to more than 160
different types (Rhoads, 2007). No consensus
has emerged on which of the many influence
taxonomies is the most useful (Toon, 2002).
Hence, studies of the relative effectiveness of
different techniques often draw upon different
category systems.
Attempting to consolidate research on influ-
ence attempts, a recent meta-analysis by Hig-
gins et al. (2003) assessed the effectiveness of
six influence tactics in the workplace—
assertiveness, exchange, ingratiation, rational-
ity, upward appeal, and self-promotion—across
23 studies. Work outcomes included both ex-
trinsic results such as salary and promotion, and
also performance assessments from supervisors
and researchers in laboratory and field environ-
ments. Ingratiation and rationality had a
strongly positive influence on both performance
assessments and extrinsic success, with
weaker positive effects of self-promotion. As-
sertiveness had a negative effect on perfor-
mance assessments, but a positive effect on
extrinsic success. The positive effects of in-
gratiation and self-promotion on performance
assessments were notably stronger in the lab-
oratory environment.
Comparing across cultures, Leong and col-
leagues (2006) found that rational tactics, such
as consultation, inspiration, and written appeals,
were more effective in the U.S. workplace than
in China, whereas a cluster of contingent con-
trol techniques such as exchange, gift-giving,
and socializing were effective with no cultural
differences. In the military context, Military
Information Support Operations (MISO), for-
merly known as Psychological Operations
(PSYOP), are planned activities directed at for-
eign target audiences used by the U.S. govern-
ment to secure national objectives (U.S. Army
Special Operations Command, n.d.). Predicting,
recognizing, and measuring the effects of MISO
is a major challenge (Perry, 2008). Assessing
the effectiveness of such operations requires
both reliable assessment of any changes in be-
havior or attitudes and evidence that these
changes are actually attributable to MISO. Un-
derstanding what types of influence attempts
work, and which ones do not, is essential to
duplicate positive results and avoid unsuccess-
ful ones (Perry, 2008).
The survey for the current study used an
adapted version of Marwell and Schmitt’s
(1967) 16-category system. It includes tactics
found to be cross-culturally valid, such as gift-
giving (Leong et al., 2006); was developed us-
ing four different influence scenarios (rather
than focusing on a single situation such as an
employee trying to get a raise); and offered a
balance between a good range of tactics without
being too elaborate to implement in an online
survey. It has also been extensively used and
cited in the research literature. More detail on
our implementation of the Marwell and Schmitt
categories is given in the Measures section.
Military and Culture
The Role of Culture in Military Operations
Culture can be conceptualized as a shared
way of life with common goals, beliefs, atti-
tudes, language, and modes of action (Berry,
Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992). In cross-
cultural influence attempts, culture may play a
role in differences in language, perceptions, ex-
pectations, trust, and, ultimately, success. Hajjar
(2010) defines cross-culturally competent sol-
diers as having the “knowledge, attitudes, and
behavioral repertoire and skill sets that military
members require to accomplish all given tasks
and missions involving cultural diversity” (p.
249).
Although the U.S. military operates in many
culturally different regions, the importance of
culturally competent soldiers is a relatively new
concept. When U.S. troops invaded Afghanistan
in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, there was limited
emphasis on cultural training (Komarow, 2004),
and flawed cultural assumptions at both the
strategic and tactical levels led to problems for
military operations. Cultural mishaps such as
male soldiers patting down women for weap-
ons, soldiers pointing with their index fingers,
and the failure to recognize sacred sites caused
tension between soldiers and the local popula-
tion (Watkins, 2007). Repeated individual cul-
tural faux pas can add up to a perception of
institutionalized insensitivity that creates con-
429MILITARY INFLUENCE TACTICS
flict and challenges for individual tactical mis-
sions and strategic military goals (Lewis, 2006).
Cultural Training
Despite the military’s statements about the
importance of cultural competence, the use of
cultural training to increase soldiers’ ability
to live and perform in culturally diverse en-
vironments varies throughout the military
both between career fields and between war
and peacetime. Prior to operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the military focused on lethal
capabilities and neglected to develop knowl-
edge, skills, and trained personnel who could
shape the operational environment with non-
lethal means (Rogers, 2005). Developing and
integrating nonlethal means, supported by
cultural training, is an ongoing process.
Some specific career fields, such as Special
Forces, Foreign Area Officers, Civil Affairs,
Military Information Support, and attachés, do
emphasize cultural competence (Hajjar, 2010;
Lewis, 2006). The training other soldiers re-
ceive varies by deployment location, emphasis
by commanders, and time restraints prior to
deployment. Some soldiers receive as little as
two to four hours, and most training only results
in a tourist level of cultural competence (Lewis,
2006).
One Department of Defense funded study on
cultural competence attempted to identify gen-
eral psychological variables relevant to military
cross-cultural influence (Ross, 2008). Interview
data from nine army officer and enlisted males
revealed that empathy (understanding other
people’s feelings), interpersonal skills (atti-
tude and communication skills), mental mod-
els (perspective taking), and willingness to
engage/openness to experience were impor-
tant for mission success in cross-cultural, de-
ployed interactions.
The Current Study
The goal of the current study was to investi-
gate the perceived effectiveness of cross-
cultural influence attempts by soldiers interact-
ing with culturally different populations while
deployed. We explored whether cultural train-
ing and the choice of influence techniques con-
tributed to the relative success of influence
attempts in Iraq and Afghanistan. We also
examined whether the more general psycholog-
ical factors identified in Ross’s (2008) inter-
views replicated for a larger sample of both men
and women from multiple services.
Research Questions
To understand military influence attempts
compared to existing cross-cultural influence
research, three initial questions were asked:
1. Does the choice of influence technique
predict the perceived success of influence
attempts?
2. Does cultural training predict ratings of
influence success?
3. Do other general psychology variables
predict the perceived success of influence
attempts?
Method
Participants
Criterion for participation in the survey in-
cluded U.S. military service, deployment expe-
rience to Iraq and/or Afghanistan, and multiple
face-to-face interactions with host country ci-
vilians. Participants were recruited through
postings on social networking Web sites, e-
mails to known military member contacts,
write-ups in military journals, and flyers. Addi-
tionally, National Guard members in Oregon
and Colorado were offered a $100 donation to
each of their Emergency Relief Funds if 25
qualified National Guard members from their
respective states completed the survey. A total
of 253 individuals started the survey, 228 of
which qualified for participation by having
face-to-face interactions with civilians while
deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. Of qualified
participants, 119 completed the survey, and 109
completed part of the survey and were included
in some analyses.
The total qualified participants included 187
males and 32 females, of which 169 had served
in the Army, 39 in the Air Force, 13 in the
Marines, and 7 in the Navy. Ninety-five were
National Guard members, 92 Active Duty, and
29 Reservists. Deployment experience included
136 members deployed to Iraq, 53 deployed to
Afghanistan, and 39 with experience in both
Iraq and Afghanistan. The timing of the 337
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influence attempts reported included 356 made
during or after 2001, 6 during 2000 or earlier,
and 13 responses of “I don’t know/classified.”
To increase participation, Army National
Guard units in Colorado and Oregon were con-
tacted to offer a $100 donation to their Emergency
Relief Fund from the Groups and War Lab at the
University of Oregon for each 25 qualified Na-
tional Guard members from their respective states
completed the survey (up to $200).
Design
Data were collected using an anonymous on-
line survey that included two sets of questions,
demographic questions, and questions related to
two separate influence attempts. Participants
were instructed not to provide classified infor-
mation, and an “I don’t know/classified” re-
sponse was included for each content question.
At the beginning of each influence section,
participants were told that we were interested in
situations in which you tried to influence the attitudes,
behaviors, or beliefs of [Iraqi or Afghani] civilians. For
example, you may have tried to increase reporting of
suspicious behavior to local authorities, promote pos-
itive attitudes toward U.S. soldiers, or decrease the
frequency of children throwing stones at soldiers.
Think of the time you were most successful in influ-
encing one or more [Iraqi or Afghani] civilians.
They were asked to think of two influence
attempts—their most successful attempt and
one that was generally less successful for Iraq,
Afghanistan, or both, depending on deployment
experience. For individuals deployed to both
Iraq and Afghanistan, the order of country ques-
tions, Iraq and Afghanistan, was counterbal-
anced. Hence, those deployed to one country
were asked to report on two influence attempts;
those deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan
reported two influence attempts for each coun-
try, for a total of four.
No existing instrument for measuring cross-
cultural influence attempts of deployed soldiers
was available. For the initial data collection, we
relied on open-ended questions to gather infor-
mation without predetermining the possible re-
sponses. Responses were used to modify the
survey to create multiple choice questions. We
hoped that the shift to multiple-choice questions
would improve the survey completion rate by
decreasing the amount of time required. For ex-
ample, the initial open-ended question “What ev-
idence made you think your influence attempt was
not very successful?” was revised to offer six
responses to the question “What evidence helped
you evaluate how successful your influence at-
tempt was?” including (a) directly observed a
change/no change in behavior; (b) person/people
involved directly expressed different/unchanged
beliefs/attitudes; and (c) official data/news reports,
including statistics about voting, survey data,
school enrollment, and so forth.
Shortening the survey length by eliminating
open-ended questions and providing National
Guard incentives increased completion rates
from 38% (41 of the first 107 participants) to
65% (78 of the 121 who took the survey after
the changes were implemented).
Measures
Participants answered questions about lan-
guage skills, cultural training, and time spent
in country. In line with the cross-cultural
competence factors found in Ross’s (2008)
interview data from deployed soldiers, they
rated themselves on empathy, language abil-
ity and cultural knowledge, respect toward
cultural differences (openness), and prior re-
lationships (experience).
Influence techniques adapted from Marwell
and Schmitt’s (1967) study were used to assess
the nature of soldiers’ attempts to influence
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of civilians. In
their study, 608 college students indicated their
likelihood of using each of the 16 techniques for
each of four scenarios. Marwell and Schmitt
categorized these 16 techniques into five fac-
tors: rewarding activity, punishing activity, ex-
pertise, activation of impersonal commitments,
and activation of personal commitments, using
a factor analysis with oblique varimax rotation
(see Table 1). For the current study, the wording
of the original 16 influence techniques was
modified for easier comprehension, and each
was followed by a description (see Table 1). For
example, the original technique of “pregiving,”
defined as rewarding a target before requesting
compliance, was renamed as gift and defined as
giving a gift, then making a request.
Participants identified which techniques were
used for each influence attempt and which tech-
niques they had ever used in each country, Iraq
or Afghanistan. To assess the relative success-
fulness of influence attempts and techniques,
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participants rated each influence attempt on a
scale from 1 (not at all successful) to 10 (ex-
tremely successful). Participants deployed to
one country had two success ratings, one for the
relatively successful attempt and one for the
relatively unsuccessful attempt, whereas partic-
ipants deployed to both countries had four rat-
ings.
Results
Four sets of analyses examined both the char-
acteristics of the data and the pattern of results
relevant to our research questions. First, we
completed a manipulation check to verify that
the two influence attempts reported did, in fact,
differ in perceived effectiveness. Second, we
completed a factor analysis to determine the
groupings of the 16 influence techniques in our
data. We then compared the relative frequency
of use for the different factor clusters between
successful and unsuccessful attempts, using re-
peated measures ANOVA. Finally, we ran a set
of regression analyses to determine whether
characteristics of the soldiers (such as demo-
graphics, and cultural training) and characteris-
tics of the targets (such as friendliness and fa-
miliarity to the soldiers) predicted perceived
effectiveness of the influence attempts. For sol-
dier characteristics, separate multiple regression
analyses were run for the unsuccessful and the
successful attempts to avoid violating assump-
tions of independence. For target characteristics
(which, unlike soldier characteristics, might
vary across attempts), we used conditional lo-
gistic regression, which matches attempts by the
same person and evaluates the difference scores
between targets in the relatively unsuccessful
and successful attempts.
Manipulation Check
A paired samples t test confirmed that success
ratings for successful influence attempts were
higher (M ! 6.47, SD ! 1.99) than ratings for
unsuccessful attempts (M ! 3.99, SD ! 2.01),
t(131) ! 11.51, p " .001.
Influence Technique Clusters
A principal component factor analysis of the 16
influence techniques ever used in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan with oblique promax rotation resulted in
five factors that explained 61.62% of the variance.
The five clusters were (a) negative techniques
(negative traits, moral appeal, negative esteem,
negative expertise); (b) power differential tech-
niques (aversive stimulation, pleading, punish-
ment, negative self-feeling); (c) positive traits
Table 1
16 Influence Techniques and Original Factor Clusters
Factor Technique Description
1 Reward If you comply, I will reward you
Gift Give gift, then make request
Liking Be nice so target will want to comply with your request
2 Punishment If you don’t comply, I will punish you
Aversive stimulation Punish until they comply with your request
3 Positive expertise If you comply, good things will happen to you
Negative expertise If you don’t comply, bad things will happen to you
4 Moral appeal You are immoral if you do not comply
Positive self-feeling You will feel better about yourself if you comply
Negative self-feeling You will feel worse about yourself if you do not comply
Positive traits A good person would comply
Negative traitsa A bad person would not comply
Positive esteem People you care about will think better of you if you comply
Negative esteema People you care about will think worse of you if you do not comply
5 Debt You owe me compliance because of past favors
Pleading I need your compliance very badly, so please do it for me
Negative traitsa A bad person would not comply
Negative esteema People you care about will think worse of you if you do not comply
Note. Techniques and factors from Marwell & Schmitt (1967); descriptions have been modified for easier comprehension.
a Indicates techniques loaded at .3 level or higher in two different factors.
432 WOLFE AND ARROW
(positive expertise, positive traits); (d) resource
techniques (gift, reward, liking, debt); and (e) pos-
itive feeling (positive esteem, positive self-
feeling). Techniques for all five factors loaded at
.40 or above (see Table 2).
Three of the 16 items loaded on a secondary
factor with less than .10 difference from its
main factor. Negative expertise in the negative
factor also moderately loads on positive traits;
negative self-feeling in the power differential
factor also moderately loads on the negative
factor, and debt in the resources factor also
moderately loads on the negative factor. Table 3
shows the correlations among the factors.
Techniques Used for Successful and
Unsuccessful Attempts
The clusters identified through factor analysis
for techniques ever used were used to group
techniques specifically used in successful and
unsuccessful influence attempts. An average
factor score was computed for each of the five
factors based on the number of items endorsed
divided by the total possible number of tech-
niques for each factor. This calculation was
completed for both successful and unsuccessful
influence attempts, resulting in five cluster
scores for each influence type. These factor
cluster scores were used to investigate whether
the choice of technique was associated with the
relative perceived success of influence attempts.
A set of five repeated measures ANOVAs
assessed differences in frequency of use be-
tween successful and unsuccessful influence at-
tempts for each factor cluster. Using Holm-
Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels (Abdi, 2010),
the first cluster of negative techniques, F(1,
86)! 19.43, p! .005, and the second cluster of
power differential techniques, F(1, 86)! 16.34,
p ! .004, were used significantly more in un-
successful influence attempts than in successful
attempts (see Figure 1). Resources, F(1, 86) !
6.46, p ! .02 and positive feelings, F(1, 86) !
13.89, p " .003 (Clusters 4 and 5), were used
significantly more in successful attempts. Posi-
tive traits, F(1, 86) ! 3.56, p ! .06, were also
more common in successful attempts, but did
not meet the conventional .05 cutoff for statis-
tical significance.
Predicting Success and Failure Based on
Demographics, Training, and Cultural
Variables
To examine which variables contributed to
the relative success or failure of soldier influ-
ence attempts, multiple regressions using 14
predictors for the perceived success of influence
attempts (10-point Likert-scale) were run. Pre-
Table 2
Factor Loadings for Promax Rotation for 16 Influence Techniques Ever Used
Factors
Negative Power differential Positive traits Resources Positive feeling
Negative traits .915
Moral appeal .678
Negative esteem .473 .325
Negative expertise .434 .391
Adverse stimulation .797
Pleading .670
Punishment .621 .342 #.426
Negative self-feeling .352 .435
Positive expertise .903
Positive traits .366 .634
Gift .867
Reward .314 .567
Liking .545
Debt .344 .379
Positive esteem .843
Positive self-feeling .303 .687
Note. Following Gorsuch’s (1983) guidelines, scores below .30 were excluded.
433MILITARY INFLUENCE TACTICS
dictors included soldier demographics (gender,
age at deployment), training types (cultural,
Civil Affairs, MISO, and Special Forces), influ-
ence target (friendliness toward troops, individ-
ual or group, familiarity, and prior relation-
ships), general cultural variables (empathy,
respect, understanding local culture), and total
time in country.
The number of participants for each analysis
varied. For some analyses, a smaller number of
participants’ responses were examined because
of missing data, and some analyses only looked
at multiple choice data from the revised survey.
Country of deployment—Iraq, Afghanistan, or
both—did not significantly predict ratings of
success for successful or unsuccessful attempts
(Fs "1), and influence attempts for both coun-
tries were combined. Hence for some analyses,
data from more than one influence attempt was
used from soldiers deployed to both Iraq and
Afghanistan. For example, participants de-
ployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan provided
data on influence techniques ever used in coun-
try separately for the two countries.
Two regressions were run to determine if
deployment experience was correlated with
ratings of success for either successful or un-
successful influence attempts. Because two
influence attempts were discussed, the charac-
teristics of these situations (e.g., target of influ-
ence, familiarity, and time in country) could
vary between the attempts. Empathy and respect
were strongly correlated with success ratings for
both sets of influence attempts—the relatively
successful (r ! .61, p " .001) and relatively
unsuccessful (r ! .71, p " .001) attempts.
To resolve issues of multicollinearity, empa-
thy and respect were averaged to create a new
variable. A reduced model that included the
average between reported empathy and respect
($ ! .39, p " .001), and familiarity ($ ! .24,
p ! .01) significantly predicted influence at-
tempt success ratings for the relatively success-
ful attempts, F(2, 106) ! 14.21, p " .001. As
Table 3
Correlation Matrix for Technique Clusters Ever Used in Iraq and Afghanistan
Factor Negative Power differential Positive trait Resource Positive feeling
Negative — .350 .326 .249 .356
Pwr diff — .269 .265 .207
Pos trait — .357 .036
Resource — .032
Pos feeling —
Note. Repeated correlation values excluded.
Figure 1. Influence technique cluster use for successful and unsuccessful influence attempts.
Note. ! Significant differences at the p " .05 level.
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empathy, respect, and familiarity increase, suc-
cessfulness of influence attempt ratings also in-
crease. Inclusion of the other variables failed to
explain a significantly greater amount of vari-
ance beyond the reduced model (%R2 ! .07,
p ! .66).
A regression for the relatively unsuccessful
influence attempt ratings produced a reduced
model of empathy/respect ($ ! .26, p ! .02)
and prior relationships ($ ! .25, p ! 19.02),
which significantly predicted unsuccessful in-
fluence attempt success ratings, F(2, 79) !
5.89, p ! .004. As the average of empathy and
respect and ratings of prior relationships in-
crease, ratings of relative success increased.
As with the first regression, adding the re-
maining variables failed to improve on the re-
duced model (%R2 ! .07, p ! .89). Because the
combined empathy and respect variable was
substantially correlated with prior relationships
(r ! .53, p " .001) and understanding local
culture (r ! .70, p " .001), residuals were used
for the variables of prior relationships and un-
derstanding local culture in order to simplify the
final interpretation of the factors and resolve
issues of multicollinearity.
A conditional logistic regression compared
soldier responses for target characteristics for
their successful and unsuccessful influence at-
tempts. No significant differences were detected
for familiarity or prior relationships, but the
difference in friendliness ratings of targets for
relatively successful (M ! 2.25, SD ! .998)
and unsuccessful (M ! 2.92, SD ! 1.19) influ-
ence attempts was significant (B ! #1.57, p !
.002). Friendliness ratings of the influence tar-
get ranged from 1 ! very friendly toward U.S.
soldiers to 5 ! very hostile toward U.S. sol-
diers, with these means falling between 2 !
somewhat friendly and 3 ! mixed or neutral.
Discussion
Predictors of Success and Failure
The greater use of negative and power differ-
ential techniques with relatively less successful
influence attempts, and the reliance on positive
feelings (and, less reliably, positive traits) for
the most successful attempts, fits prior research
findings that “soft” techniques are generally
more effective than “hard” techniques (Falbe &
Yukl, 1992). Our finding that the resource tech-
nique cluster was associated with successful
influence attempts is also in line with the cross-
cultural endorsement of a gift-giving/exchange
cluster as effective by both U.S. and Chinese
managers (Leong et al., 2006).
Among the measured variables, empathy/
respect, familiarity, prior relationships, and tar-
get friendliness significantly predicted the rated
success of influence attempts, although only the
averaged empathy/respect variable significantly
predicted success ratings in both relatively suc-
cessful and relatively unsuccessful attempts.
These results are consistent with Ross’s (2008)
findings from military member interviews de-
scribing cross-cultural situations. Ross (2008)
found interpersonal skills, including rapport
building, empathy, perspective taking, and
openness to experience, were critical elements
of cross-cultural competence, with perspective
taking being the most important factor.
Ross’s elements can be combined into two
variables, relationship building (interpersonal
skills and openness to experience) and general
personality traits (empathy and perspective tak-
ing), and compared with combined significant
factors of relationship building (prior relation-
ship and familiarity) and general personality
traits (empathy and respect). Using these com-
bined variables, general personality traits emerge
in both studies as the most vital element of cross-
cultural interactions, significant for both success-
ful and unsuccessful influence attempts, and most
commonly mentioned in interviews (Ross, 2008).
Additionally, elements of relationship building
were found to be the second most important aspect
in cross-cultural competence (Ross, 2008), and the
only additional factors significantly correlated to
success ratings.
Connecting this back to the techniques clus-
ters, the resource cluster includes tactics such as
gift and liking that fit well with the relationship-
building factors from the Ross (2008) findings.
Reliance on positive feeling also fits with the
effectiveness of empathy and perspective taking
in predicting success.
Factor Structure of Techniques
The five influence technique clusters that
emerged—negative techniques (negative traits,
moral appeal, negative esteem, negative exper-
tise), power differential techniques (aversive
stimulation, pleading, punishment, negative
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self-feeling), positive traits (positive expertise,
positive traits), resource techniques (gift, re-
ward, liking, debt), and positive feeling (posi-
tive esteem, positive self-feeling)—fit into con-
ceptually logical categories. These categories,
however, differ from the factors found in Mar-
well and Schmitt’s (1967) study (see Table 1).
These differences in technique clustering
may be linked to how technique use was as-
sessed. Marwell and Schmitt (1967) ask partic-
ipants about their likelihood of technique use in
future interactions, whereas the current study
focused on techniques already used. Prediction
of future behavior can be interpreted using the
theory of planned behavior, which postulates
that certain motivational factors lead to inten-
tion which in turn leads to behavior choice
(Ajzen, 1991). Although this theory has merit,
past behavior is a better predictor of future
behavior (Wong & Mullan, 2009). Two of the
Marwell and Schmitt factors combine nega-
tive and positive techniques—for example, pos-
itive and negative expertise hang together as a
factor. This abstract similarity may be compel-
ling when contemplating hypothetical actions
for scenarios supplied by an experimenter. For
actual outcomes determined by the response of
the influence target, however, the general neg-
ativity or positivity of the approach may be a
more compelling similarity. Thus, the factor struc-
ture found in the current study likely represents a
more predictive clustering of which techniques are
more likely to be actually used together.
Limitations and Future Research
Although past behavior is a more reliable pre-
dictor of future behavior than intentions, a retro-
spective study of events, some of which happened
10 years ago, has its own problems. Information
on influence attempts should ideally be collected
shortly after they are made, during debriefing ses-
sions when troops return to base after a mission,
for the most reliable reporting.
Another limitation of this study is the use of
single-item measures for some of the variables
potentially contributing to influence attempt suc-
cess. Participants were asked, for example, “What
cultural factors played an important role in your
influence attempt? Check all that apply,” and pre-
sented with 12 responses, such as respecting, ac-
knowledging, and being open to cultural differ-
ences, basic differences between U.S. and Iraqi
culture, and the importance of saving face, main-
taining, honor, and national pride.
Because there are numerous situational aspects
that may impact influence effectiveness, but so
little literature on the influence attempts of de-
ployed soldiers, we chose to cast a broad net and
assess a wide range of variables at a superficial
level. This framework can shape future research
questions about military influence attempts. How-
ever, null findings should not be taken as evidence
that a variable had no effect, as measurement
unreliability is a plausible alternative explanation.
Military Application of Results
The two primary military applications for this
study’s findings are to inform policy discussions
about cultural training and also to inform the
choice of tactics for MISO operations. In predict-
ing ratings of influence success, of notable impor-
tance is the lack of impact of cultural, Civil Af-
fairs, MISO, and Special Forces training. The
focus of cultural, Civil Affairs, and Special Forces
training is not influence and is most likely not
tailored to teaching cross-cultural communication
and influence skills. However, if this training is
expected to produce culturally competent soldiers
skilled at influencing civilians, aspects of training
may need to be modified to address or improve
these skills. Soldiers face dynamic situations
while deployed, and they must understand how
and when to use both lethal and nonlethal tools
(Daniel, 2010). Developing nonlethal military ca-
pabilities (Rogers, 2005) involves not only train-
ing but also ensuring that training is effective.
The second application is for MISO. This
study provides a comprehensive analysis of in-
fluence operations and is focused on friendly
reports. In a resource-constrained environment,
reports of soldiers on the ground may augment
sparse measures of effectiveness and help better
assess and ultimately shape military influence
operations. It may also provide a new perspec-
tive of the types of questions to ask in order to
asses MISO effectiveness. Instead of assessing
the effectiveness of a single influence attempt,
this study assesses numerous influence attempts
across Iraq and Afghanistan to identify potential
keys to success or failure.
Knowing that negative techniques and power
differential factors were used significantly more
in unsuccessful influence attempts than in suc-
cessful attempts provide a base for future re-
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search. What types of challenges evoked the
choice of these tactics? What situational factors
are similar when these techniques are selected?
These questions can be asked for the resources
and positive feelings factors, which were used
significantly more often in successful attempts.
Understanding the conditions surrounding in-
fluence technique use will be helpful in dissect-
ing the complex military influence environment
and ultimately make future technique selection
more deliberate and, one hopes, more successful
in achieving the desired objectives.
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